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Cost Analysis for a Dedicated Search and Rescue Capability for Commander 
Strike Fighter Wing U.S. Pacific Fleet  
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
Lemoore is a Master Jet Base, but is one of the few on the West Coast without an in-house, dedicated 
Search and Rescue (SAR) capability. The lack of SAR at Lemoore is a growing concern due to the 
increase in the number of squadrons at Lemoore, the new Lemoore Military Operating Airspace 
(MOA), and the need to use the Offshore Warning Areas for more training due to increased 
congestion in other airspaces. As a result, Commander Naval Air Forces (CNAF) is examining the 
issue of returning a dedicated SAR capability to Naval Air Station Lemoore (NASL).  
The objective of this project is to provide a cost comparison and analysis of the pros and cons of 
different models for providing Lemoore with dedicated SAR. A key assumption is made that the 
Navy has a sufficient inventory of helicopters. Thus, the cost of procuring new helicopters is not 
considered. A second assumption is that due to high workload for Fleet Helicopter Wings, 
detachments from these Helicopter Wing squadrons in support of a full-time SAR detachment at 
NAS Lemoore are not feasible. Due to time constraints for this project, only the five most viable 
SAR models are considered.  
Data was gathered from multiple DoD, Federal Government, and civilian organizations. A 
spreadsheet analysis of the data was conducted, and then used to make meaningful, equivalent 
comparisons of the five viable SAR models. The results show that the two least expensive models for 
returning dedicated SAR capability to Lemoore are to establish a SAR detachment for Lemoore from 
an already existing Navy SAR unit, followed closely by the slightly more expensive model of using 
the government acquisition process to procure contract SAR for Lemoore from a commercial entity.  
Analyses support the recommendation for the Navy to procure contract SAR for Lemoore via the 
government acquisition process. Contracts for civilian SAR offer both low cost and the flexibility of 
one-year options, which would allow the service to be easily discontinued if funds are cut. 
Precedence for contract helicopter services exists at Marine Air-Ground Task Force Training 
Command (MAGTFTC), Twentynine Palms, CA. Fleet & Industrial Supply Center (FISC) personnel 
have offered assistance in drafting the Statement of Work and Source Selection Board Plan. The 
Department of Interior’s Aviation Management Office exists to perform inspections and 
certifications of commercial helicopter providers and has offered to do so for the Navy. Contract 
SAR would be operational 6 months after Request for Proposal (RFP) announcement. 4  
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND  
A. INTRODUCTION  
NAS Lemoore (NASL) is the home port for sixteen F/A-18 squadrons and four Carrier Air 
Wings. As a Master Jet Base it is the focal point for Navy F/A-18 training on the West Coast. 
Commander Strike Fighter Wing Pacific (CSFWP) is responsible for the Wing’s aircraft when home-
ported and is tasked with ensuring the squadrons have the necessary support they need to meet the 
primary mission of providing fully qualified Carrier Air Wings to the Carrier Battle Group. A key 
part of this support is providing Operational Risk Management (ORM) mitigation to ensure that 
CSFWP aircrews can safely complete their training. As such, the presence of dedicated Search and 
Rescue (SAR) capability is central to ensuring that CSFWP is able to meet its mission.  
Over the past five years, the training airspaces available to CSFWP have become congested 
due to several factors to include the increase in the number of F/A-18 squadrons home-ported at 
NASL. This increased congestion in CSFWP’s traditional training airspaces (especially that of the 
Edwards/China Lake training airspace) resulted in both the February 2008 commissioning of the 
NASL Military Operating Area (MOA), and the increased need to use both the Offshore Warning 
Areas W283/285/532 and the Fort Hunter Liggett training airspaces. However, unlike the 
Edwards/China Lake training airspaces, which have full-time dedicated SAR coverage via Navy H-
60 helicopters based out of NAWS China Lake; the NASL MOA, the Offshore Warning Areas, and 
the Fort Hunter Liggett training airspaces are devoid of any full-time dedicated SAR assets, putting 
at risk the lives of the CSFWP aircrews who are increasingly flying over these unprotected airspaces.  
B. BACKGROUND  
CSFWP lost its in-house, dedicated SAR support with the disestablishment of the Lemoore 
SAR division in 2004. A Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) paper proposing disestablishment 
recommended using some of the savings resulting from the closure of 8  
Lemoore SAR to procure such services from other SAR capable agencies.1 To date, this has 
not happened. More importantly, CSFWP SAR requirements have changed significantly since the 
CNA study due to the increased usage of training airspaces such as W283/285/532, Fort Hunter 
Liggett, and the recently-commissioned Lemoore MOA.  
The CNA study stated Coast Guard Air Station (CGAS) San Francisco’s proximity to 
Lemoore was adequate to provide SAR support to meet CSFWP needs. Both recent CSFWP mishaps 
and increased responsibilities for the USCG invalidate the accuracy of this statement. CGAS San 
Francisco Operations Officer, CDR Wesley Trull delineated the problem as follows: “Again, my 
concern is we will not be able to pull your aircrews out of the water in time to save their lives worst 
case. The water temps may get them even if they eject successfully. Add poor weather and possible 
maintenance problems with my HH-65 aircraft and your line runs even thinner.” (CDR W. Trull, 
USCG, personal communication, July 13, 2004).  
C. PROBLEM  
The problem of the lack of dedicated SAR for CSFWP was most recently demonstrated in the 
VFA-125 mishap of June 2006 that occurred over Fort Hunter Liggett, CA. Wing and tenant staff 
promptly notified SAR units nearest the Fort Hunter Liggett area of their need for help to recover two 
possible survivors. The SAR scenario described next unfolded. The 129th Air National Guard 
Operations Duty Officer (ODO) informed the Wing Chief of Staff Officer (CSO) that he could not 
help the SAR effort because the 129th was deployed and unavailable (this is a common situation for 
the 129th). The Fort Hunter Liggett staff informed the Wing that they had no helicopter assets at the 
fort at that time (this also is a common situation). Calls to the Vandenberg SAR unit were not made 
as this unit has been decommissioned (further worsening the SAR situation over W283/285/532).  
The San Francisco Coast Guard expeditiously dispatched a helicopter to execute the SAR, 
but it was still en route more than two hours after the call for SAR was initiated  
1 Boning W.B., Ebert J.G., Keenan J.D., & Pedrick P.C. (1999). OUTSOURCING 
HELICOPTERS FOR LAND BASED-SEARCH AND RESCUE. RAD, Repository/Production 
Services. Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia. 9  
due to a need to stop and refuel at Monterey (a common need for the Coast Guard due to the 
short fuel legs of its HH-65 helicopters). The non-injured survivor walked to a nearby road and was 
recovered by a pickup truck while the Coast Guard was still en route. Had this one survivor been 
seriously injured and down in an inaccessible area or if a search had been required to locate an 
injured survivor, there is a substantial probability the survivor could have died. Unfortunately in this 
scenario, the other pilot involved in the mishap was killed upon impact during the midair collision. 
This mishap vividly demonstrates the SAR dilemma that currently exists for CSFWP and its tenant 
commands.  
D. PROJECT OBJECTIVES  
The objectives of this project are to:  
1.  
Provide a cost comparison of different models for establishing a dedicated SAR unit for NAS 
Lemoore.  
 
Analyze the implementation pros and cons of each model.  
 
Provide CSFWP with a recommendation of the SAR model to use to establish dedicated SAR at 
NAS Lemoore. Provide information to facilitate the establishment of the recommended SAR model.  
 
E. PROJECT SCOPE  
A critical assumption of this report is that the Navy has in its current inventory a sufficient 
number of helicopters to support the transfer of one or two aircraft to NAS Lemoore for the purpose 
of standing-up a new SAR unit or a SAR detachment from an existing unit. Thus, the cost of 
procuring new helicopters is not considered. This, of course, is not relevant to the contract solution 
explored. A second assumption is that due to the current high operational tempo and work load for 
Fleet Helicopter Wings, the report does not analyze a model for SAR that uses helicopter 
detachments from these Fleet Helicopter Wing squadrons. Owing to these above-mentioned 
assumptions and the time constraints for preparing the report, this report focuses on five viable 
models for 10  
providing dedicated SAR at Lemoore: (1) establish SAR in the image of NAS Whidbey 
Island (NASWI) SAR; (2) establish SAR in the image of NAS Fallon SAR; (3) establish SAR in the 
image of NAWS China Lake SAR; (4) establish SAR in the form of a detachment from an already 
existing SAR station; and (5) procure contract SAR from a commercial entity. The methodology used 
to make the comparisons amongst these five models will be explained in the following section.  
F. METHODOLOGY  
The goal of this analysis was to gather data from various active SAR units to determine what 
model NASL SAR should adopt. First, SAR data was obtained from NAS Whidbey Island, NAS 
Fallon, and NAWS China Lake. The data obtained listed the number of aircrew and maintenance 
personnel assigned to each station. Also, as is the case with all three of these units, the cost of the 
contract maintenance was gathered as was information regarding the costs per flight hour (CPH) for 
the aircraft in use at NAS Whidbey Island, the MH-60S Knighthawk. According to FY08 data, the 
targeted CPH for fuel, Aviation Depot Level Repairables (AVDLR), and Aviation Fleet Maintenance 
(AFM) were used to calculate both individual station flying costs based on their annual flight hour 
allocation, as well as a baseline flying cost for 240 hours of annual flying. Finally, their respective 
administrative budgets were included in the total costs for operation, so that the project team could 
determine an absolute annual cost associated with each SAR unit.  
To determine the costs associated with a year-long detachment, some calculations were made 
using the data received above, as well as some assumptions regarding detachment costs at NASL. 
First, in order to cover the 16-hour daily fly window at NASL, at least two complete crews available 
for operations each day while on detachment are needed. This equates to ten aircrew of various ranks 
and two contract maintainers. These figures were used to determine the added costs associated with 
these detachment personnel, to include military and civilian annual salaries, per diem, lodging, and of 
course the added flight-hour costs associated with an additional 240 hours of flight operations while 
on detachment to NASL. By summing these values, the added cost of 11  
2 Dutton R.A. (2007). SOLICITATION/CONTRACT/ORDER FOR COMMERCIAL 
ITEMS. SOLICITATION NUMBER M67399-07-R-0002. Fleet & Industrial Supply Center. San 
Diego, CA.  
augmenting an existing SAR station with the necessary aircrew, contract maintainers, and 
flight hours to execute a year- long detachment to NASL were identified.  
Finally, the costs associated with contracting SAR from a civilian aviation company were 
collected. There were two methods used to determine reasonable estimates for a contract SAR 
solution. The first came from Marine Air-Ground Task Force Training Command (MAGTFTC), 
Twentynine Palms, CA. This station contracts exclusively to Air Methods Incorporated for air 
ambulance service on an annual basis.2 The values obtained from this contract were used as a starting 
point for what is anticipated for SAR costs with an adjustment for 240 hours instead of the 
MAGTFTC contract requirement of 300 hours. Additionally, completely independent of the 
MAGTFTC information, the project team queried a local helicopter operator on potential costs for 
SAR coverage of NASL for 240 hours annually. The information received was in-line with 
MAGTFTC contract SAR values, and thus, incorporated into this analysis.  
Once the information was gathered for each course of action (COA), the numbers were calculated to 
determine not only total costs for each unit, but also a cost for operations if each unit were to fly 240 
hours annually, which is an amount determined to be adequate to cover the flying schedule at NASL. 
In both scenarios, a cost per hour was determined as a final calculation for determining which COA 
operates at the lowest costs per flight hour. 12  
II. RESULTS  
The results of this analysis are shown below. The specific costs that comprise these totals are 
shown in Appendix A in Tables A-1 through A-4. Included along with the analysis totals are basic 
pros and cons associated with each COA.  




Military manning of aircrew as well as maintenance offers flexibility for squadron activity (i.e., the 




Requires CNAF transfer of MH-60S from existing unit to NASL.  
o  
H-60 Full Mission Capable (FMC) percentage is relatively poor  
(< 70%).  
o  
Time requirement for implementation due to manning document and airfield facility support is at 
best 12-15 months, typically 18-24 months.  
o  
More difficult to disestablish if funding becomes unavailable in the future.  
o  




Total Cost of Operations: $5,378,434  
Total Cost per Flight Hour: $6,403  
Cost of Operations for 240 hours: $4,050,034  
Cost per Flight Hour for 240 hours: $16,875  




Minimizes total manning requirement due to contract maintenance.  
o  
The advantage of organic dedicated SAR.  
o  








H-60 Full Mission Capable (FMC) percentage is relatively poor  
(< 70%).  
o  
Time requirement for implementation due to manning document and airfield facility support is at 
best 12-15 months, typically 18-24 months.  
o  




Total Cost of Operations: $6,467,414  
Total Cost per Flight Hour: $5,053  
Cost of Operations for 240 hours: $4,164,854  
Cost per Flight Hour for 240 hours: $17,354  




Minimizes total manning requirement due to contract maintenance.  
o  
The advantage of organic dedicated SAR.  
o  





Requires CNAF transfer of H-60F from existing unit to NASL.  
o  
SAR is part of Test and Evaluation squadron at NAWS China Lake. Complex stand-up requirements 
if trying to combine with current Lemoore squadron, such as VFA-125.  
o  
H-60 Full Mission Capable (FMC) percentage is relatively poor  
(< 70%).  
o  
Time requirement for implementation due to manning document and airfield facility support is at 
best 12-15 months, typically 18-24 months.  
o  




Total Cost of Operations: $4,466,680  
Total Cost per Flight Hour: $9,504  
Cost of Operations for 240 hours: $3,957,460  
Cost per Flight Hour for 240 hours: $16,489  




Least expensive option.  
o  
Fallon SAR acquires at least one additional helicopter.  
o  
The advantage of organic dedicated SAR.  
o  




Requires CNAF transfer of H-60F from existing unit to NASL.  
o  
H-60 Full Mission Capable (FMC) percentage is relatively poor  
(< 70%).  
o  
Quality of life concerns for shore-based crews on detachment often during the year.  
o  
Inefficient use of government funds for per diem and lodging costs while aircrew and contract 
maintainers are on detachment.  
o  
Necessary to ferry aircraft, parts, and personnel to and from NAS Fallon to NASL.  
 
Total Cost of Operations: $1,855,777  
Total Cost per Flight Hour: $7,732  




Quickest and easiest to implement.  
o  
Option to not renew contract if future funding becomes unavailable.  
o  
Second least expensive option.  
o  




Reliance on civilian contractor for maintenance and aircrew performance (non-organic).  
 
Total Cost of Operations: $2,259,680  
Total Cost per Flight Hour: $9,415 15  
III. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
A. SUMMARY  
The consequences of continuing to train and operate the West Coast Hornet Fleet without a 
viable, dedicated SAR capability are unacceptable. Due to the inherent risks associated with Naval 
Aviation, it is never a question of “if”, but rather a question of “when” will the next mishap occur. As 
recent high visibility mishaps in both military and general aviation have shown, availability of SAR 
assets are necessary to provide immediate location and recovery of survivors. The analyses 
conducted for this project determined the following cost per hour (based on 240 flight hours) of the 
five most viable models of providing dedicated SAR capability for CSFWP:  
 .  
NAS Whidbey Island - $16,875  
 
NAS Fallon – $17,354  
 
NAWS China Lake - $16,489  
 
Detachment Concept - $7,732  
 
Contract – $9,415  
 
B. CONCLUSIONS  
This study shows that the lowest cost option for establishing a dedicated SAR capability for 
CSFWP is the detachment model. However, this model has the significant drawback (as do the other 
three military options) of requiring that one or two helicopters be taken/transferred from other Navy 
helicopter squadrons/stations. Also, the detachment model has another serious negative aspect in that 
it adversely impacts the quality of life of both the military and civilian personnel who will be 
required to do substantial amounts of Temporary Assigned Duty (TAD) time away from home in 
support of the Lemoore detachment (in addition to the added per diem and lodging expenses that will 
be incurred in support of the detachment). Finally, it takes longer to both establish SAR capability 
and decommission it in the event of future budget cuts. This is a negative aspect of all four military 
SAR models.  
An analysis of the pros and cons of each of the five models clearly reveals the contract SAR 
option to be the superior model. This superiority of the contract SAR 16  
model is of sufficient magnitude that it renders the minute cost difference between the 
detachment model versus the contract SAR model insignificant. The flexibility germane to the 
contract option is beneficial to the Navy on several levels: First, this option allows the Navy to cancel 
the contract should funding not be available in the future; second, the ease of implementation of a 
contract SAR solution (in terms of both timeliness and manpower issues) offers the Navy the fastest 
means to establish dedicated SAR capability for CSFWP; and finally, it may serve as an immediate, 
interim solution should the Navy decide to pursue an organic military SAR solution to CSFWP’s 
current SAR deficiency. Ultimately, the desired end state is increased readiness and safety for 
CSFWP Hornet aircrews operating on the West Coast. The most economical, timely, and efficient 
means of achieving this capability supports implementation of the contract SAR model.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS  
The following recommendations are made to accomplish the objective of establishing a dedicated, 
low cost SAR capability for CSFWP in a manner that is easy to implement in terms of both 
timeliness and quality of life/manpower issues, and can be discontinued in the event of budget cuts:  
1.  
Establish a dedicated SAR capability for CSFWP via the contract SAR model.  
 
Work with Fleet & Industrial Supply Center San Diego (FISCSD) personnel to draft a 
comprehensive, clearly defined Statement of Work (SOW), Source Selection Board Plan (SSP), and 
Request for Proposal (RFP) using the MAGTFTC, Twentynine Palms contract for helicopter 
ambulance services as a template.  
 
Use OPNAVINST 3130.6 and guidance from both the Department of Interior’s Aviation 
Management Division and Navy SAR Model Manager to draft the over-water SAR requirements for 
inclusion in the SOW, SSP, and RFP.  
 
Coordinate with the Department of Interior’s Aviation Management Division to enter into an 
agreement to utilize its inspection services to certify that the  
17  
  
commercial helicopter providers who respond to the Navy’s RFP for contract SAR are able to meet 
the CSFWP’s SAR requirements as detailed in the SOW, SSP, and RFP.  
5.  
Write the contract in one-year increments or with one-year options so that the SAR service can be 
simply discontinued in the event of future budget cuts.  
18  
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APPENDIX A  
Manning RequirementsNumber PersonnelGranular CostNumber PersonnelGranular CostNumber PersonnelGranular Cost Aviators (O‐4)2$266,4782$266,478 Aviators (O‐
3)6$659,8504$439,9006$659,850 Aviators (O‐2)1$90,035 Aircrew (E‐7)1$88,2501$88,250 Aircrew (E‐6)4$296,5202$148,2601$74,130 Aircrew (E‐5)5$303,3953$182,0372$121,358 Aircrew (E‐
4)1$47,5233$142,5694$190,092 Corpsman (E‐5)1$60,670 Maintainers (E‐8)1$99,425 Maintainers (E‐7)2$176,500 Maintainers (E‐6)6$444,780 Maintainers (E‐5)5$303,395 Maintainers (E‐
4)1$47,523 Civilian Contractors7$630,00031$2,346,00013$2,300,000Manning Costs$3,453,674$3,613,494$3,406,100Flight Hour Allocation FY08 (hrs/year)8401280470 Target Fuel Cost per 
Hour / Fuel Target FY08$457$383,880$457$584,960$457$214,790 Target AVDLR CPH / AVDLR Target FY08$1,260$1,058,400$1,260$1,612,800$1,260$592,200 Target AFM CPH / AFM Target 
FY08$497$417,480$497$636,160$497$233,590Total CPH / Total Flying Costs FY08$2,214$1,859,760$2,214$2,833,920$2,214$1,040,580Administrative Budget 
($/year)$65,000$20,000$20,000Total Costs$5,378,434$6,467,414$4,466,680Cost per Hour$6,403$5,053$9,504NAS Whidbey Island, WANAS Fallon, NVNAWS China Lake, CA  
Table A- 1: Military SAR Annual Costs  
Manning RequirementsNumber PersonnelGranular CostNumber PersonnelGranular CostNumber PersonnelGranular Cost Aviators (O‐4)2$266,4782$266,478 Aviators (O‐
3)6$659,8504$439,9006$659,850 Aviators (O‐2)1$90,035 Aircrew (E‐7)1$88,2501$88,250 Aircrew (E‐6)4$296,5202$148,2601$74,130 Aircrew (E‐5)5$303,3953$182,0372$121,358 Aircrew (E‐
4)1$47,5233$142,5694$190,092 Corpsman (E‐5)1$60,670 Maintainers (E‐8)1$99,425 Maintainers (E‐7)2$176,500 Maintainers (E‐6)6$444,780 Maintainers (E‐5)5$303,395 Maintainers (E‐
4)1$47,523 Civilian Contractors7$630,00031$2,346,00013$2,300,000Manning Costs$3,453,674$3,613,494$3,406,100Flight Hour Allocation FY08 (hrs/year)240240240 Target Fuel Cost per 
Hour / Fuel Target FY08$457$109,680$457$109,680$457$109,680 Target AVDLR CPH / AVDLR Target FY08$1,260$302,400$1,260$302,400$1,260$302,400 Target AFM CPH / AFM Target 
FY08$497$119,280$497$119,280$497$119,280Total CPH / Total Flying Costs FY08$2,214$531,360$2,214$531,360$2,214$531,360Administrative Budget ($/year)$65,000$20,000$20,000Total 
Costs$4,050,034$4,164,854$3,957,460Cost per Hour$16,875$17,354$16,489NAS Whidbey Island, WANAS Fallon, NVNAWS China Lake, CA  
Table A- 2: Military SAR with 240 hour Baseline 20  
Additional Manning Requirements# PersonnelGranular CostPer Diem Cost ($28/day)Lodging Rate ($/night)Lodging Cost Aircrew (O‐4)1$133,239$9,940$35$12,425 Aircrew (O‐
3)4$439,900$39,760$35$49,700 Aircrew (E‐6)2$148,260$19,880$30$21,300 Aircrew (E‐5)2$121,358$19,880$30$21,300 Aircrew (E‐4)1$47,523$9,940$20$7,100Total Manning Costs per 
Year10$890,280$99,400$111,825Flight Hour Allocation FY08 (hrs/year)240 Target Cost per Hour / Target Fuel FY08$457$109,680 AVDLR CPH / AVDLR Target FY08$1,260$302,400 AFM CPH / 
AFM Target FY08$497$119,280Total CPH / Total Flying Costs FY08$2,214$531,360Contractor Maintenance Det Costs Standard work week hours40 Billing rate $/hour$39.76 Cost per 
week$1,590.40 Annual Cost per Maintainer$82,700.80 Anticipated Maintainer Requirement2Total Maintainer Cost$165,401.60Contractor Per Diem + Lodging NASL$81Per Diem $46/day, 
Lodging $35/day # days to be detached355 Annual Per Diem per maintainer$28,755 Anticipated Maintainer Requirement2Total Per Diem/Lodging Costs$57,510Total Detachment 
Costs$1,855,776.60Cost per Hour$7,732.40NAS Fallon SAR Detachment  
Table A- 3: SAR Detachment at NASL  
Marine Air‐Ground Task Force Training Command (MAGTFTC), Twentynine Palms, CALocal Commercial OperatorAnnual Service fee for Operating Costs 
(June 09‐June 10)$2,503,020$1,886,000Contract Cost Per Hour$1,788$1,100Flight Hour Costs for 240 hours240$429,120$264,000Contract without fuel 
costs (Dry)$2,932,140$2,150,000Anticipated Gallons per Year (100 gal/hr burn rate)24,00024000Fuel Costs (Contract Rate/Gallon 
JP)$4.57$109,680$109,680Total Contract Award$2,932,140$2,259,680Cost per Hour$12,217$9,415  
Table A- 4: Contract SAR  
21 
